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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 19-2748 
___________ 
 
JOHN F. MCGINNIS, JR., 
        Appellant 
 
v. 
 
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 2:13-cv-06484) 
Chief District Judge: Honorable Juan R. Sánchez 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
on March 17, 2020 
 
Before: JORDAN, BIBAS, and PHIPPS, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: April 2, 2020) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
Pro se appellant John F. McGinnis, Jr., appeals from the District Court’s order affirming 
the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security granting in part and denying in 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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part his request for disability insurance benefits (DIB) and supplemental security income 
(SSI) under the Social Security Act. For the reasons set forth below, we will affirm the 
District Court’s judgment. 
I. 
Because we write primarily for the parties, we will recite only the facts necessary for 
our discussion. In 2006, McGinnis filed for DIB and SSI, alleging disability beginning on 
February 12, 2003. In 2008, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) decided that McGinnis 
was not disabled as of the alleged onset date. In 2010, the Appeals Council denied review. 
McGinnis then filed an action for review in the District Court. The Social Security Admin-
istration filed for a remand in order, among other things, to reevaluate the weight given to 
the opinions from Dr. Jeffrey Perlson and Dr. Ronald Abraham. In 2012, the District Court 
remanded the case for additional administrative proceedings. 
On remand, McGinnis amended the alleged onset date of his disability to June 14, 2004, 
his 50th birthday. He claims that he was disabled as a result of degenerative disc disease 
of the cervical spine, cervical radiculopathy, and carpal tunnel syndrome. McGinnis testi-
fied that he was a mail carrier for the U.S. Postal Service for approximately 29 years, end-
ing in February 2003. He experienced radiating neck pain, numbness in his hands, and back 
pain that made it difficult to sleep, sit, stand, and bend. He estimated that he could lift about 
five pounds without being in pain, and that his pain would not allow him to stand for six 
hours in a workday. McGinnis took Advil for the pain. On a weekly basis, he was able to 
walk to the library, eat out with friends for several hours, and sit on a bus for several hours 
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to go to the casino. He was also able to clean the cellar, do the laundry, and prepare his 
meals. 
Dr. Cheryl Collier-Brown, M.D., treated McGinnis from January 2002 to August 2002, 
and once on September 13, 2005. Dr. Collier-Brown ordered several tests and recom-
mended various work limitations for McGinnis from January 2002 to August 2002. But, 
she determined that McGinnis could return to full-duty work on September 4, 2002. When 
Dr. Collier-Brown examined McGinnis in 2005, she noted that he was experiencing de-
creased strength in his hands, but she could not medically support a claim for disability 
because McGinnis had not received any treatment or testing since 2002. In 2007, McGinnis 
was evaluated by Dr. Perlson, D.O., who observed McGinnis and reviewed his medical 
history. Dr. Perlson recommended that McGinnis be limited to lifting 10 pounds and that 
moderate limitations be placed on his upper-extremity pushing and pulling. Dr. Perlson did 
not recommend any restrictions on sitting, walking, or lower-extremity pushing and pull-
ing. In 2008, McGinnis was evaluated by Dr. Abraham, D.O., who also observed McGinnis 
and reviewed his medical history. Dr. Abraham made recommendations similar to those of 
Dr. Perlson, adding that McGinnis should be limited to 30 minutes of standing and 30 
minutes of sitting in an eight-hour day. 
The ALJ issued a decision on February 6, 2013, finding that McGinnis was disabled 
beginning on June 13, 2009, but not disabled, and not entitled to benefits, before that date. 
In rendering the decision, the ALJ applied the five-step sequential evaluation process for 
determining disability. See Jones v. Barnhart, 364 F.3d 501, 503 (3d Cir. 2004); 20 C.F.R. 
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§§ 404.1520(a), 416.920(a).1 Specifically, the ALJ concluded that at step four, McGinnis 
retained the residual functional capacity to perform “light work,” which may include lifting 
up to 20 pounds, “a good deal of walking or standing,” and prolonged periods of sitting, 
see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b). As part of this finding, the ALJ discredited the opinions of 
Dr. Perlson and Dr. Abraham, noting, among other things, that their opinions were based 
on reviews of the treatment provided by Dr. Collier-Brown and McGinnis’s subjective 
complaints. 
The ALJ further determined that McGinnis’s subjective complaints of pain were not 
entirely credible for two reasons. First, McGinnis stated that he did not return to work in 
late 2002 because he was in the process of getting his disabilities diagnosed. But medical 
documentation showed that he did not go back to work because he was convicted of driving 
under the influence (DUI), lost his driver’s license, and would have had to walk his mail 
route. Second, the ALJ noted that, despite his complaints, McGinnis had not sought signif-
icant medical treatment between 2003 and 2005.  
McGinnis again requested review of the ALJ’s decision, which the Appeals Council 
denied. McGinnis commenced another action in the District Court seeking review of that 
 
1 The Commissioner must make determinations at each step until the applicant is found to 
be disabled or not disabled. Those determinations consist of: (i) whether the applicant has 
engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged disability onset date; (ii) whether 
the applicant has a severe impairment or combination of impairments; (iii) whether the 
impairment or combination of impairments meets the criteria of a listed impairment; 
(iv) whether, despite the severe impairment, the applicant retains the residual functional 
capacity to perform his past relevant work; and (v) whether the applicant is capable of 
performing other jobs that exist in the national economy, considering his age, education, 
work experience, and residual functional capacity. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4).  
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decision. The District Court, adopting the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation 
over McGinnis’s objections, affirmed the ALJ’s decision. This appeal ensued. 
II. 
We have jurisdiction over this appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 
Like the District Court, we must uphold the ALJ’s findings—including credibility deter-
minations—if they are supported by substantial evidence. See Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 
F.3d 546, 552 (3d Cir. 2005); Burns v. Barnhart, 312 F.3d 113, 130 (3d Cir. 2002). Sub-
stantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate 
to support a conclusion.” Rutherford, 399 F.3d at 552 (quoting Reefer v. Barnhart, 326 
F.3d 376, 379 (3d Cir. 2003)). It is “more than a mere scintilla but may be somewhat less 
than a preponderance of the evidence.” Id. (quoting Ginsburg v. Richardson, 436 F.2d 
1146, 1148 (3d Cir. 1971)). 
III. 
We agree with the District Court’s thorough analysis of the record and its disposition 
of this case. Before this Court, McGinnis argues primarily that the ALJ erred in crediting 
Dr. Collier-Brown’s opinion and discrediting the opinions of Dr. Perlson and Dr. Abraham. 
Specifically, McGinnis argues that the ALJ should not have considered Dr. Collier-
Brown’s opinions because her treatment predated the alleged onset date of McGinnis’s 
disability. But the ALJ properly considered all the medical evidence in the record, includ-
ing the records from Dr. Collier-Brown’s treatment. See Chandler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 
667 F.3d 356, 360–61 (3d Cir. 2011) (explaining that the ALJ properly considered older 
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medical records which tracked a claimant’s “injury and deterioration during the time peri-
ods surrounding her disability onset date,” which was amended several times). 
McGinnis also argues that the ALJ was not permitted to discredit the opinions of Dr. 
Perlson and Dr. Abraham. But while the ALJ must “explain the weight given to physician 
opinions and the degree to which a claimant’s testimony is credited,” Chandler, 667 F.3d 
at 362, a physician opinion “does not bind the ALJ on the issue of functional capacity,” id. 
at 361 (quoting Brown v. Astrue, 649 F.3d 193, 196 n.2 (3d Cir. 2011)). Here, the ALJ 
explained that he discredited the opinions of Dr. Perlson and Dr. Abraham because, among 
other things, their opinions were based on reviews of the treatment provided by Dr. Collier-
Brown and subjective complaints from McGinnis. Cf. id. (“[T]reating and examining phy-
sician opinions often deserve more weight than the opinions of doctors who review rec-
ords . . . .”). Ultimately, substantial evidence in the record, including Dr. Collier-Brown’s 
medical opinions, supplemented by McGinnis’s testimony about his activities, supported 
the ALJ’s determination that McGinnis was capable of light work. 
McGinnis further argues that the ALJ improperly determined that he was not credible 
because he was convicted of a DUI. But the ALJ did not discredit McGinnis’s testimony 
simply because of his conviction.2 Rather, the ALJ found that McGinnis’s testimony that 
he did not show up for work due to his disability was inconsistent with medical records 
 
2 In any event, we note that an ALJ may use “ordinary techniques of credibility evaluation” 
in assessing a claimant’s credibility. See Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1284 (9th Cir. 
1996); see also Hardisty v. Astrue, 592 F.3d 1072, 1080 (9th Cir. 2010) (affirming credi-
bility determination based in part on claimant’s criminal history); Simmons v. Massanari, 
264 F.3d 751, 756 (8th Cir. 2001) (same). 
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showing that he did not return to work because he would have had to walk his route as a 
result of his DUI conviction. The inconsistent testimony was a proper basis for the ALJ to 
determine that McGinnis was not credible. See Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 363 (3d 
Cir. 1999) (holding that the ALJ properly evaluated credibility where he cited specific in-
stances where the claimant’s testimony was inconsistent with the objective medical evi-
dence in the record). 
We have considered McGinnis’s remaining arguments on appeal and conclude that they 
are without merit.3 Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.  
 
3 We note that the District Judge did not err in declining to recuse himself, as McGinnis 
has not shown that “a reasonable person, with knowledge of all the facts, would conclude 
that the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” In re Kensington Int’l Ltd., 
368 F.3d 289, 301 (3d Cir. 2004). And to the extent McGinnis’s brief raises new claims, 
including claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, we will not consider them 
in this appeal. See In re Reliant Energy Channelview LP, 594 F.3d 200, 209 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(“[W]e will not consider new claims for the first time on appeal.”). 
